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IDENTIFYING AN AUSTRALIAN ‘SHADOW’
BENEFIT / COST RATIO FOR PUBLIC PROJECTS
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the social opportunity cost of a hypothetical public project in 
Australia and compares these values with the cost of the project as measured by factor 
prices. Since 2001, the Australian taxation system has included an ad valorem tax, the 
Goods and Services Tax, however relatively little analysis of the impact of this tax on 
public project evaluation methods has been undertaken. This tax creates divergences 
between social opportunity cost and conventional cost measures. Therefore it is 
recommended that shadow prices be applied to pubic projects. Following Campbell (1975), 
a shadow price can be introduced into Australian project evaluation in the form of a cut-off 
benefit cost ratio. The calculations reported on in the paper indicate that this ratio lies 
between 1 and 1.3 for public projects in Australia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers and practitioners have long considered the problem of what discount rate to 
use when evaluating public sector projects. Naïve application of a discount rate can lead to 
a serious misallocation of resources within an economy, making public sector projects look 
more (or less) attractive than they should be in economic terms. Often the use of discounted 
cash flow techniques overlooks a key economic issue – the benefit/cost study should take 
into account both the trade-off between current and future consumption (social time 
preference or STP), and the social benefits that could be obtained from alternative uses of 
resources involved (social opportunity cost or SOC) (Campbell (1975), pp.171-2). 
As Creedy (2007) has noted, the STP rate is sometimes called the ‘consumption discount 
rate’ as it is applied to money values of consumption in each period. However, the pure 
time preference rate is sometimes called the ‘utility discount rate’ because it is applied to 
weighted consumption values, with the weighting function described as a ‘utility function’. 
In most applied cost benefit analysis literature, it is simply taken for granted that 
discounting money values is appropriate, rather than starting from the more fundamental 
social welfare function. This is because, from the perspective of many practitioners, it is 
often more difficult and time consuming to estimate the social welfare function. Often the 
additional analytical return is meager for the extra effort involved. 
HM Treasury (2003) recommends that STP be used as the standard real discount rate for 
future benefits and costs. It comprises two components: (1) the rate at which individuals 
discount future consumption over present consumption, assuming no change in expected 
per capita consumption; and (2) an additional element, if per capita consumption is 
expected to grow over time. In the UK context this was estimated to be 3.5%, which takes 
into account diminishing marginal utility from consumption over time when there is 
expected to be additional per capita consumption.   
In a study of STP rates across 167 countries and across time from 2005-2050, Joice and 
Prado (2006) estimated that the STP for Australia was 3.3% within a range 2.8% to 3.8%. 
However, the gaps in shadow pricing for taxes on individual inputs can represent omitted 
costs as well as benefits, where the tax treatment of the input varies according to use 
(Bureau of Transport Economics (1999), p.86). Diesel fuel taxes in Australia are one 
example of this. This paper extends an analysis developed for the Canadian context in 
Campbell (1975) to an appropriate benefit/cost rule for evaluating Australian public 
projects in light of a national ad valorem tax. 
II. PUBLIC INVESTMENT
Typically, economic practitioners assume that undertaking an additional public project 
diverts resources from private to public use. In this case we consider that factors of 
production such as labour and capital are in fixed supply between the public and private 
sectors. As Campbell (1975, p.172) has noted, use of other sources of factors of production 
(unemployed resources, other areas of the public sector or the foreign sector) could readily 
be incorporated into an extension of this analysis. 
This raises a critical question. To what extent does the use of resources in a public sector 
project, which may produce a stream of benefits, curtail private activity but still lead to an 
increase in social welfare? It can be argued that social welfare is improved when social 
benefits (SB) from the project exceed the social benefits the factors or production would 
have otherwise produced from private use. This latter foregone benefit can be termed the 
social opportunity cost (SOC) of the project. 
The standard Benefit Cost Rule that most practitioners apply is: 
SB / SOC > 1. 
For the purpose of this analysis we assume that there is no risk or uncertainty attached to   
the benefit. This allows us to focus on the SOC associated with drawing factors of 
production from the private sector. It is possible to make an approximate estimate of SOC 
using market prices and interest rates for the consumption goods that the resources used in 
the public project would have otherwise produced in private use. 
We assume that this estimate of SOC exceeds the private market valuation of the resources 
(or ‘Cost’) by an amount equivalent to the present value of tax payments that would have 
been generated by their use in the private sector. The introduction of a tax ‘wedge’ in the 
analysis drives us to introduce a revised benefit/cost rule based on a more easily obtained 
measure of cost: 
SB/ ‘Cost’ > SOC / ‘Cost’ 
In this instance SOC exceeds ‘Cost’ by the present value of foregone tax payments, so the 
cut-off benefit/cost ratio (SOC/’Cost’), exceeds unity. This enables us to simplify the 
calculation of a shadow benefit/cost ratio for evaluating projects in the Australian public 
sector, along the lines of Campbell (1975). 
III. MEASURING SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY COST
Suppose that a proposed public project employs labour and capital services with a private 
market value of $10 in the current year. While the timeframe is a limiting assumption, 
introduction of additional years of construction does not add anything in particular to this 
analysis. 
Setting aside circumstance relating to market distortions (i.e. monopolistic or 
monopsonistic behaviour), it is possible to conceive two causes of a divergence between 
SOC and ‘cost’: an indirect tax on consumption goods, and a tax on profits (Campbell 
(1975), pp.173). 
We can assume that a fixed proportion, (b), of labour and capital services is diverted from   
the production of capital goods and (1 - b) is diverted from the production of private 
consumption goods. 
Therefore, $10(1 - b) worth of labour and capital services is diverted from production of 
consumption goods, with a producer’s value of $10(1 - b). Under a Goods and Services tax 
regime, an ad valorem tax is applied at rate (t). Consumers would value these services at 
the producer’s price plus the GST, or $10(1 - b)(1 + t). 
The diversion of $10(b) of labour and capital services from the production of capital goods 
would have resulted in private investment of $10(b). Following Campbell (1975, p.173), 
the consumer’s valuation of this private investment is the stream of consumption goods in 
present value terms that could be attributed to that investment. If this was the only output 
from that investment, there are four components into which it can be decomposed. 
First, indirect tax collections {t / (1 + t) }Cy, where Cy is the value at consumer prices of 
foregone consumption in year y. 
Second, where there are tax collections on profits, these can be estimated by {1 / (1 + t)Cy
– Xy}x, where Xy represents the cost of the variable factors of production, and x is a flat 
rate profit tax. 
Third, private sector profits net of tax are {1 / (1 + t)Cy – Xy}(1 – x). 
Fourth, there is value added attributable to the use of variable factors, Xy. 
We make the assumption that in the absence of the private investment project, these 
variable factors would be employed in an alternative activity, so they would have yielded 
Xy. Therefore, the fourth component of the consumer value of consumption goods forgone 
is offset by a corresponding benefit elsewhere in the economy. 
The annual net social benefit forgone as a result of displacing the private investment is (Cy   
– Xy). If we assume that investment of $10(b) would have resulted in a flow of 
consumption goods in perpetuity, the annual social return forgone as a result of the 
displacement of the private project can be expressed as $10(b)r*, where r* is a real rate of 
return in perpetuity that incorporates the three components of value of forgone consumption 
goods, and represents a net social loss. 
The present value of the annual net social loss is $10(b)(r* / r), where r is the real market 
rate of interest. 
Recognising that the displaced investment’s profits, net of tax, would have represented a 
return of r%, which is the opportunity cost rate of return, r*% will exceed the market rate 
by an amount corresponding to the foregone indirect and profits tax collections. 
The SOC of the proposed public project is the present value of the privately produced 
consumption goods forgone as a result of diverting $10 (1 - b) from the production of those 
goods, and $10(b) from the production of investment goods. The SOC can be calculated to 
be: $10{ (1 – b)(1 + t) + b(r* / r) }. 
IV. A ‘SHADOW’ BENEFIT/COST RATIO
Suppose an analyst adopts the $10 estimate as the ‘cost’ of the public project discussed in 
this paper. In many cases it may appear to be reasonable to use market prices to estimate 
the value of the labour and capital services employed in the project. However, this may lead 
to an incorrect project evaluation because of a tax-induced wedge between ‘Cost’ and SOC. 
Since the standard benefit/cost rule is SB / SOC > 1, where SOC exceeds ‘Cost’ because 
indirect and business profit taxes are positive, the use of a ‘Cost’ concept in CBAs will tend 
to make public projects appear more favourable in their impact on social welfare than they 
actually are. 
The annualised yield on 10-year Commonwealth Government Bonds over ten years to   
October 2008 was 5.8%. Over that same period the consumer price index increased by 
3.2% per annum. This gives a real market rate of interest (r) of 2.5%. Real interest rates 
have been higher in earlier periods. 
The following table shows the range of k values, k = (1 – b)(1 + t) + b(r* / r), where t is 
10% and r* is 2.8%. 
B  R  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06 
0.00  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10 
0.25  1.53  1.18  1.06  1.00  0.97  0.94 
0.50  1.95  1.25  1.02  0.90  0.83  0.78 
0.75  2.38  1.33  0.98  0.80  0.70  0.63 
1.00  2.80  1.40  0.93  0.70  0.56  0.47 
The following table shows the range of k values, k = (1 – b)(1 + t) + b(r* / r), where t is 
10% and r* is 3.8%. 
B  R  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06 
0.00  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10 
0.25  1.78  1.30  1.14  1.06  1.02  0.98 
0.50  2.45  1.50  1.18  1.03  0.93  0.87 
0.75  3.13  1.70  1.23  0.99  0.85  0.75 
1.00  3.80  1.90  1.27  0.95  0.76  0.63   
V. POLICY CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a Benefit / Cost Rule for evaluating public projects in Australia. 
Following Campbell (1975), the rule has two parameters: a real market rate of interest 
(reflecting the social time preference), and the shadow benefit / cost ratio (reflecting the 
social opportunity cost). Use of the rule requires the following approach: 
1. compute a set of estimates of the time-stream of values, at current prices, of Social 
Benefits; 
2. compute a set of estimates, at current prices, of the time stream of ‘Costs’; 
3. compute the real market rate of interest and use it to form the ratio of present value 
of Social Benefits to the present value of ‘Costs’; 
4. select an appropriate value for b on the basis of the nature of the proposed project 
and the proposed arrangements for financing it; and 
5. accept or reject the proposal according to whether the ratio of Social Benefit / ‘Cost’ 
is greater or less than the k value implied by r and b. 
We might reasonably expect r to be between 2 and 4 per cent, while b values might 
typically be expected in the range 0.25 to 0.50. With r* in the range 2.8 to 3.8 per cent, this 
means the value of k will normally be in the range 1 to 1.3, implying benefits may need to 
be up to 30% more in present value terms than costs before such a proposal could be 
accepted.  
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